This season marks five years since the Mets acquired Roberto Alomar as part of an ill-fated attempt to revamp what had been the lowest-scoring lineup in the major leagues in 2001. Alomar was part of an offseason that saw the Mets try to build around Mo Vaughn, Jeromy Burnitz and Roger Cedeno. While the other three carried spotty track records and injury concerns, Alomar was the safe bet out of the bunch. Alomar came to New York with 12 consecutive All-Star appearances, a three-year run in Cleveland where he finished in the top five in the MVP voting twice, and sporting a career line of .306/.378/.455, not unlike another New York middle infielder.
Then poof.
Alomar’s first year with the Mets, at the age of 34, saw him put up a line of .266/.331/.376, boosted by a glimmer of false hope in July. The All-Star Roberto Alomar was gone forever.
This year, a few October hopefuls have been dealing with atrocious starts from players they’re counting on as much as the 2002 Mets were counting on Alomar. If you had suggested after Alomar’s April 2002 line of .267/.325/.390 that he was done, it would have seemed insane. At this point sample size warnings are in full effect, but that doesn’t mean we have to swallow our local color commentator’s rosy “you know at the end of the year he’ll have his numbers” prognostications. With that in mind, let’s remember the Alomar and look at three key players, all over the age of 30, for teams that entered the season with better chances at October than the 2002 Mets.
Below the players’ names are their career AVG/OBP/SLG and 2007 numbers, including their PECOTA collapse rate, courtesy of Baseball Prospectus 2007.
Carlos Delgado, 35
Career: .281/.389/.553
2007: .196/.284/.265 Collapse: 45%
Delgado threw a scare into Mets fans last season when he essentially went 0 for May. He rebounded to have a strong second half and left fans with a .351/.442/.757 postseason to savor over the winter. This season, the ball has not jumped off his bat at all as he’s struggled to slug his weight. Worse, he’s looked downright old—on a team that has Julio Franco, no less. As the Mets wait for David Wright’s power to return, they’re going to need Delgado to bounce back once Shawn Green comes back to Earth and Moises Alou takes a month off for a Hamptons summer.
Paul Konerko, 31
Career: .282/.352/.494
2007: .202/.294/.383 Collapse: 35%
The good news for White Sox fans is that they’ve been here before. In 2003, at the age of 27, Konerko put up a putrid .234/.305/.399 line. It was suggested in some sabermetric circles that he was a hitter with “old player skills,” whose peak may have come and gone. Konerko responded by belting 116 home runs over the next three seasons. The White Sox are Jim Thome’s rate stats and Mark Buehrle’s contract push away from battling the Royals rather than being contenders in a stacked AL Central. They need Konerko to start hitting enough for us to take a good look at Jermaine Dye’s similar but lesser struggles.
Manny Ramirez, 35
Career: .313/.410/.596
2007: .227/.330/.330 Collapse: 41%
Ramirez’ slow start has been overshadowed by the fact that they’re in first place. Helped by All-Star level starting pitching from two guys who didn’t require a posting fee, and the Yankees only being up to plague seven, they’ve been able to open up a comfortable lead on their hated rivals. Eventually the Yankees will start playing up to their underlying metrics, and the Red Sox won’t be able to carry a shell of Manny, especially while J.D. Drew is enjoying rush festivities at the Abreu Sigma Giles fraternity of stathead darlings who lose their power. A winning streak from the Bronx Bombers will have the Boston media clamoring for “Manny being Manny” to come back and replace “Manny being Robby.”
I’m not suggesting that any, let alone all three, of these guys are done. But one of my favorite things about PECOTA is the distribution for the results of its forecasts (75% of players reaching their 25th percentile, 10% reaching their 90th percentile, etc.). All three of these guys came into the season sporting collapse rates over 35%. That doesn’t necessarily mean that one out of these three will collapse. But given the awful starts and the collapse rates, it’s fun to guess who might pull a Robby.
Of the three, I’ll go with Konerko, based on 2003 and his inferior track record.
Anyone else care to hazard a guess?
(ed. note: Stats are as of the beginning of play on Thursday. Nice game, Manny.)
Thursday, May 3, 2007
Baseball Tonight: Artificial Debate Central?
Have the producers of Baseball Tonight told their analysts to disagree with each other no matter what the issue?
The other night, John Kruk and Steve Phillips were asked to name their player of the month for April. Phillips chose A-Rod, but Kruk chose Vladimir Guerrero because he didn’t want to pick the obvious choice.
(That argument got overshadowed by the surreal debate over the Indians sending Fausto Carmona down to the minors. When Phillips (pro) asked Kruk (con) how he would feel if returning from injury he lost his job to someone with a couple of good games, all Kruk could do was huff. The hard feelings were palpable the rest of the night.)
Wednesday night, apparently it was Kruk’s turn to be reasonable. Kruk and Fernando Vina—who sometimes looks at the camera as if it’s Albert Belle’s forearm coming at him all over again—were asked to rank their top three aces in baseball, setting aside salary. Kruk chose Santana, Halladay and Oswalt. Vina chose Colon, Willis and Beckett. He was being serious. Apparently, it’s not a fireable offense for a retired second baseman to think Johan Santana isn’t one of the three best pitchers in baseball, but it would be if he consoled Santana with a hug.
I know it would be boring if they just sat around agreeing with each other, but rather than disagreeing over something that should be obvious, wouldn’t the producers be better served to scrap the segment in favor of something truly divisive?
I can’t wait to see what happens when the Indians recall Carmona.
The other night, John Kruk and Steve Phillips were asked to name their player of the month for April. Phillips chose A-Rod, but Kruk chose Vladimir Guerrero because he didn’t want to pick the obvious choice.
(That argument got overshadowed by the surreal debate over the Indians sending Fausto Carmona down to the minors. When Phillips (pro) asked Kruk (con) how he would feel if returning from injury he lost his job to someone with a couple of good games, all Kruk could do was huff. The hard feelings were palpable the rest of the night.)
Wednesday night, apparently it was Kruk’s turn to be reasonable. Kruk and Fernando Vina—who sometimes looks at the camera as if it’s Albert Belle’s forearm coming at him all over again—were asked to rank their top three aces in baseball, setting aside salary. Kruk chose Santana, Halladay and Oswalt. Vina chose Colon, Willis and Beckett. He was being serious. Apparently, it’s not a fireable offense for a retired second baseman to think Johan Santana isn’t one of the three best pitchers in baseball, but it would be if he consoled Santana with a hug.
I know it would be boring if they just sat around agreeing with each other, but rather than disagreeing over something that should be obvious, wouldn’t the producers be better served to scrap the segment in favor of something truly divisive?
I can’t wait to see what happens when the Indians recall Carmona.
Tuesday, May 1, 2007
The Cabrera Conundrum: When do you give up on talent and potential?
Every five days or so, my cognitive dissonance flares up. I’ve been dealing with this condition since Thanksgiving 2004, when my cousin and I began discussing the Orioles’ upcoming 2005 season. Little did I know it was a conversation that would last nearly two-and-a-half years.
My cousin the Orioles fan, and eternal optimist, tried to convince me that if some of the Orioles young pitchers were good, they might contend. The one pitcher who became the center of the debate was Daniel Cabrera. I saw a pitcher who had just walked more batters than he struck out. He saw a raw pitcher with electric stuff who had just one season in the majors. We were both right.
From that point we traded taunts based on Cabrera’s performances. A typical exchange would go something like this:
Cousin Optimist: Cabrera looked good last night.
Me: It’s one start, his numbers are still iffy.
CO: Yeah, but he’s still young.
Me: He was born the same week as Jake Peavy and Carlos Zambrano.
CO: Yeah, but those guys are really good.
Me: Yes, they are.
And around it would go, even as Cabrera raised his strikeout rate in ’05, but then improbably raised his walk rate even higher in ’06. I’m as tantalized as my cousin by Cabrera’s physical ability, but I feel like he should’ve taken the next step by now, his age 26 season. Given my hunch that good pitchers become good before they’re 26, and bolstered by the thoughts of those smarter than I am, I took a quick and dirty look into it.
The first step was defining good. Rather than setting the bar at guys who became mega-millionaires this past winter, I defined a good starting pitching season as a season good enough to be a number two starter on a generic playoff team. With the help of baseball-reference.com, I looked at the eleven 162-game seasons that have been played in the wildcard era. I took the number two starters from the 88 playoff teams over that period and created a composite number two starter on a playoff team based on the average number of innings and the weighted mean adjusted ERA+ of the 88 pitchers. The 88 pitchers were selected by simply taking the pitcher with the second highest adjusted ERA+ among pitchers who made at least 25 starts for the team that year. That number was picked to restrict the list to pitchers that were more likely to have been in the team’s original plans for contention at the beginning of the year (the one exception was the 2002 Cardinals who only had one pitcher make that many starts due to injuries, trades and the passing of Darryl Kile. Jason Simontacchi defaulted into the spot). The 25 start requirement excluded trade deadline acquisitions like Randy Johnson (1998 Astros) and some household names who became instant stars mid-season (Oswalt and Santana to name a couple). On the other hand it also dethroned Shawn Chacon as the ace of the 2005 Yankees.
(At this point, I’d like to remind anyone reading this that this started out as a quick look at a debate, but, without giving away the end, I’m sufficiently intrigued by the results that I’d be thrilled if someone with more experience in this area chose to take this and run with it to give us something even more precise.)
The 88 pitchers gave me a composite number two starter on a playoff team who pitches 206 innings with an adjusted ERA+ of 119. The list of 88 provided some interesting observations.
The 88 pitchers ranged in adjusted ERA+ from 80 (Brian Lawrence, 2005 Padres) to 174 (Andy Pettitte, 2005 Astros). Steve Trachsel made the list of 88 twice with an adjusted ERA+ under 100 both times. Trachsel made the list once in 1998 with the Cubs, when Kerry Wood didn’t have enough starts to qualify, and once with the 2006 Mets’ patchwork starting rotation. The list also nicely illustrates how many different ways there are to get to October. The 2005 Astros had an extremely top heavy pitching staff. The 2006 Mets and 1996 Orioles relied more on their offenses and bullpens. The 2006 Tigers didn’t have a single starting pitcher reach 206 innings and an adjusted ERA+ of 119, but they had four who came respectably close. And, of course, the 2005 Padres won by playing in Quadruple-A.
Next, I took my composite number two starter from a playoff team and made a list of active pitchers who’ve had at least one season of at least 206 innings and an adjusted ERA+ 119 or higher (top, right). There are 54 active pitchers who meet that standard. With Daniel Cabrera in mind, I divided the list into two groups. On the left side are the pitchers who had their first such season at age 25 or younger and on the right are the ones who did it at age 26 or later. For all pitchers I included the number of times they’ve reached the No. 2 bar and their age when they first did it (as always age is as of July 1).
Some notes and observations:
· If Roger Clemens comes out of retirement, he tops the list on the left with 13.
· Peavy won the NL ERA title in 2004, but was well short of 206 innings. In 2005 he again cleared an ERA+ of 119, but missed the list by 3 innings.
· Colon, who resides on the right-hand list, missed the mark by 2 innings in 1998 and 1 inning in 1999, his age 25 and 26 seasons (though we thought they were his age 23 and 24 at the time).
· Garcia missed making the left side by 4.7 innings when he was 24. He missed time the next year and then hit the mark at 26 before settling into his role as an inning eating number 3.
· Carlos Zambrano’s four number two seasons entering his age 26 season is amazing. When Greg Maddux became a free agent after 1992, at the age of 26, he had done it three times. It’s no wonder everyone in baseball wants the Cubs to wrap him up now—except possibly Yankees fans.
· Jamie Moyer, Jamie Moyer, Jamie Moyer. To hit the mark for the first time at 35 and then hit it four more times is incredible. But the only thing he has in common with Daniel Cabrera is they’ve both pitched for the Orioles.
· Generally speaking, the left side is made up of power pitchers and groundball pitchers, most of whom also have above average control. Garland and Perez would probably fit in better with the right side group.
· On the right side, the one-hit wonders breakdown into guys who didn’t get their real shot until they were a little older (Arroyo, Harang and Wang), and non-strikeout guys who had career years with control (Towers, Pavano, Byrd, Washburn, Hernandez, and Moehler) or HR rate (Davis and Ortiz). Westbrook was a blend of the last two groups. Jennings pitched at altitude and then pitched with humid balls.
· I can’t explain Franklin.
· Wood, the only real power pitcher of these one-hit wonders, never stayed on the field and productive other than 2003.
· Lackey lowered his HR rate and raised his strikeout rate at age 26 to become a star.
· Lowe, Rogers and Wells didn’t become full-time starters until their late 20s.
· Schmidt and Carpenter teased people with their ability before putting together their full, healthy and productive seasons.
These lists seem to indicate that pitchers who achieve sustainable success as frontline starters usually do it by their age 25 seasons. Where does that leave Daniel Cabrera? He’s not a soft-tosser, he already has a good HR rate, and with 82 career starts through age 25, he’s had plenty of opportunity already. But there’s still the matter of the outlier at the top of the list.
Of the pitchers on the list, Cabrera has the most in common with Johnson. They’re tall, power pitchers, with nasty stuff that they couldn’t harness in their youth. Cabrera doesn’t have nearly the strikeout rate that Johnson had even before he broke out, but he also, amazingly enough, isn’t nearly as wild. Johnson walked 416 batters in 631.3 innings, 5.93 BB/9, in the three years before his breakout. Cabrera has walked 280 batters in 457 innings, 5.51 BB/9, over the last three years.
Does that mean Daniel Cabrera will be the next Randy Johnson? That would be surprising. The clock on him is ticking louder and louder and having more in common with Johnson than the others doesn’t change that.
But I also won’t be surprised if my cognitive dissonance returns this weekend.
Monday, April 30, 2007
Talk Radio Genius
Mike and the Mad Dog are at it again. A caller wanted to discuss last night's playoff game between the Mavericks and the Warriors. Mad Dog had to admit that he hadn't watched the game. Nonetheless, within ten minutes Mad Dog was arguing that Baron Davis is a better player than Allen Iverson. Mike tried to get him off the ledge, pointing out Iverson's MVP award and status as a lock Hall of Famer. Unconvinced, Mad Dog went to the old "If I was starting a team" and "he makes the guys around him better, Iverson doesn't" arguments. This all on the heels of Baron Davis' career week that Mad Dog hasn't watched. He even went so far as to bring up the NCAA title that UCLA (Davis' school) won--when Davis was still in High School.
This is the entertainment value and genius of the Mad Dog. He presents the sort of awkward disaster your parents always told you not to stare at and then invites you, even begs you to stare at him.
My brother once suggested to me that John Madden is a really smart guy who's made millions by pretending to be dumb.
If that's true then Mad Dog is a regular Stephen Hawking.
This is the entertainment value and genius of the Mad Dog. He presents the sort of awkward disaster your parents always told you not to stare at and then invites you, even begs you to stare at him.
My brother once suggested to me that John Madden is a really smart guy who's made millions by pretending to be dumb.
If that's true then Mad Dog is a regular Stephen Hawking.
Sunday, April 29, 2007
Bring Back the Box Office Mojo Forecast
Summer movie season is upon us, which means big movies, big busts and big box office predictions. Yes, I'll admit I'm as curious about whether Spider-man 3 will out gross Pirates 3 as I am about which will be better. I can't explain why I care how much money movies make, or when I started caring how much money movies make, but I do.
For years, one of my first stops online every Friday morning has been the Box Office Mojo forecast. This is where Brandon Gray gives his forecast which is touted as "The most accurate box office predictions since 1998." Unfortunately, the page currently has a note saying "the forecast is on hiatus, and its future is under consideration." I still get to see the consensus forecast of the site's readers, but somehow it's not the same.
I hope it's only a coincidence that this note was posted on the heels of a wildly off target forecast for Grindhouse. There's no shame in being wildly off from time to time. If everyone who missed badly on a forecast gave up, a lot of my favorite baseball writers would be out of the prediction business after some stathead darlings went bust (the Padres of a few years ago and last year's Indians to name a couple).
I hope this Friday when I click over to Box Office Mojo I'm greeted with a fresh forecast featuring a huge number. For those who care, I'll take Spider-man 3 over Pirates 3, if only because it will be facing a weaker field. The fourth weekend of Spider-man 3 will be stronger competition for Pirates 3 than anything Spider-man 3 faces this weekend.
I wonder what Brandon Gray thinks.
For years, one of my first stops online every Friday morning has been the Box Office Mojo forecast. This is where Brandon Gray gives his forecast which is touted as "The most accurate box office predictions since 1998." Unfortunately, the page currently has a note saying "the forecast is on hiatus, and its future is under consideration." I still get to see the consensus forecast of the site's readers, but somehow it's not the same.
I hope it's only a coincidence that this note was posted on the heels of a wildly off target forecast for Grindhouse. There's no shame in being wildly off from time to time. If everyone who missed badly on a forecast gave up, a lot of my favorite baseball writers would be out of the prediction business after some stathead darlings went bust (the Padres of a few years ago and last year's Indians to name a couple).
I hope this Friday when I click over to Box Office Mojo I'm greeted with a fresh forecast featuring a huge number. For those who care, I'll take Spider-man 3 over Pirates 3, if only because it will be facing a weaker field. The fourth weekend of Spider-man 3 will be stronger competition for Pirates 3 than anything Spider-man 3 faces this weekend.
I wonder what Brandon Gray thinks.
Saturday, April 28, 2007
Moneyball and Iraq: Two issues with one debate
On Wednesday night, I tuned in to a broadcast of the Red Sox-Orioles game that everyone seems to be talking about. After the game, I wasn’t thinking about Curt Schilling’s sock and his need for attention or Gary Thorne’s comments and his history of making controversial statements.
I was thinking about an innocuous comment by Jim Palmer during a J.D. Drew plate appearance.
Palmer made one of those comments about J.D. Drew’s On-Base Percentage fitting the Red Sox’s “Moneyball Philosophy.” It was the same sort of comment you hear whenever someone on the Red Sox or A’s who can draw a walk comes to the plate. Of course, with Palmer it was a straight observation, not a backhanded slap at the book or its ideas.
The way the book is still part of the baseball public’s consciousness, but the sentiment around it has shifted, reminded me of another long running debate. I realized that the trajectories of the discussions of Moneyball and the war in Iraq are interchangeable. With pro-Moneyball representing anti-war and anti-Moneyball representing pro-war, let’s plug the names of the Moneyball principals into their corresponding characters in the Iraq situation and see what we have.
Cast list:
Michael Lewis as Osama Bin Laden: Lewis, the man whose work started this all, the actual author of Moneyball, has been relatively unscathed by the anti-Moneyball crowd. So much so, that occasionally he had to pop up to remind the book’s detractors that it’s his book. Consider that his grainy video threat from a cave.
Joe Morgan as George W. Bush: Fazed by the onslaught of stat-oriented people who could be baseball experts without ever having played in the majors, and having the “smallball” bunting and hit and run strategies of his day devalued by the masses, he went on the warpath. But Morgan didn’t go after Lewis.
Billy Beane as Saddam Hussein: The A’s general manager and the star of Moneyball became the face for the anti-Moneyball crowd to attack. By allowing himself to be the subject of such a book, Beane was considered arrogant and rubbed some colleagues the wrong way. But it was Morgan in particular, speaking as though Beane had written the book himself, that went after Beane and the “Moneyball Philosophy,” Morgan’s “Axis of Evil.”
(For those of you who read Moneyball, enjoy the visual of Saddam Hussein calling up Ari Fleischer and saying, “Who’s the best looking evil dictator in the Middle East?”)
Bill James as Kim Jong-il: Before Moneyball was even released the Boston Red Sox hired the stathead forefather as a consultant. When the Red Sox entered the 2003 season without a defined closer, another untraditional move, the press derided the organization for letting a stat geek steer them off course. Then when Moneyball was released the focus went squarely to Beane and the A’s. Focused on the Red Sox’ lack of a closer, and their new target Beane, the press failed to notice that Red Sox had also cheaply acquired a Weapon of Mass Destruction.
Tim Hudson and Mark Mulder as Uday and Qusay Hussein: As the A’s kept winning and no Weapons of Mass Destruction were found in Iraq, President Morgan and his constituents needed a new explanation for their attacks. Just as Saddam’s two torturous sons provided a rational sounding reason to be in Iraq, Beane’s three young star pitchers provided a rationale for why the A’s were actually winning. He’d never, it was thought by the Morganites, win without all three of his young pitchers.
Rob Neyer, Peter Gammons and Bill Plaschke as The Nation, New York Times and Fox News: ESPN.com’s Neyer was on board with Moneyball so early that he actually helped Lewis during the writing process. Gammons, ESPN’s venerable institution and the most influential baseball writer in America, helped the “Moneyball Philosophy” gain traction in the mainstream by embracing the concepts and incorporating them into his columns. Plaschke, the esteemed and influential writer for the L.A. Times, assaulted the credibility of Moneyballers by calling them computer geek traitors, with no real love or feel for the game. He would continue these assaults on the philosophy even as the A’s stayed successful, though no WMDs were found and Uday and Qusay were gone.
Jim Palmer as the American Public: Moneyball seemed bad and war acceptable at first, but now Moneyball seems acceptable and the war in Iraq less so. The A’s keep restocking and contending for their division title and in 2004 the Red Sox used their Weapon of Mass Destruction at roughly one-third of his actual market value. Palmer, and many other commentators, followed the tide and no longer understand the purpose of the war and accept the value of Moneyball even without fully understanding what the issue was to begin with. These commentators think the book was about On-Base Percentage, rather than undervalued assets, which at the time of Moneyball just happened to be On-Base Percentage. But at least they're trying to embrace new ideas.
That leaves us with Joe Morgan, a man without an exit strategy, defending his war to the end.
I was thinking about an innocuous comment by Jim Palmer during a J.D. Drew plate appearance.
Palmer made one of those comments about J.D. Drew’s On-Base Percentage fitting the Red Sox’s “Moneyball Philosophy.” It was the same sort of comment you hear whenever someone on the Red Sox or A’s who can draw a walk comes to the plate. Of course, with Palmer it was a straight observation, not a backhanded slap at the book or its ideas.
The way the book is still part of the baseball public’s consciousness, but the sentiment around it has shifted, reminded me of another long running debate. I realized that the trajectories of the discussions of Moneyball and the war in Iraq are interchangeable. With pro-Moneyball representing anti-war and anti-Moneyball representing pro-war, let’s plug the names of the Moneyball principals into their corresponding characters in the Iraq situation and see what we have.
Cast list:
Michael Lewis as Osama Bin Laden: Lewis, the man whose work started this all, the actual author of Moneyball, has been relatively unscathed by the anti-Moneyball crowd. So much so, that occasionally he had to pop up to remind the book’s detractors that it’s his book. Consider that his grainy video threat from a cave.
Joe Morgan as George W. Bush: Fazed by the onslaught of stat-oriented people who could be baseball experts without ever having played in the majors, and having the “smallball” bunting and hit and run strategies of his day devalued by the masses, he went on the warpath. But Morgan didn’t go after Lewis.
Billy Beane as Saddam Hussein: The A’s general manager and the star of Moneyball became the face for the anti-Moneyball crowd to attack. By allowing himself to be the subject of such a book, Beane was considered arrogant and rubbed some colleagues the wrong way. But it was Morgan in particular, speaking as though Beane had written the book himself, that went after Beane and the “Moneyball Philosophy,” Morgan’s “Axis of Evil.”
(For those of you who read Moneyball, enjoy the visual of Saddam Hussein calling up Ari Fleischer and saying, “Who’s the best looking evil dictator in the Middle East?”)
Bill James as Kim Jong-il: Before Moneyball was even released the Boston Red Sox hired the stathead forefather as a consultant. When the Red Sox entered the 2003 season without a defined closer, another untraditional move, the press derided the organization for letting a stat geek steer them off course. Then when Moneyball was released the focus went squarely to Beane and the A’s. Focused on the Red Sox’ lack of a closer, and their new target Beane, the press failed to notice that Red Sox had also cheaply acquired a Weapon of Mass Destruction.
Tim Hudson and Mark Mulder as Uday and Qusay Hussein: As the A’s kept winning and no Weapons of Mass Destruction were found in Iraq, President Morgan and his constituents needed a new explanation for their attacks. Just as Saddam’s two torturous sons provided a rational sounding reason to be in Iraq, Beane’s three young star pitchers provided a rationale for why the A’s were actually winning. He’d never, it was thought by the Morganites, win without all three of his young pitchers.
Rob Neyer, Peter Gammons and Bill Plaschke as The Nation, New York Times and Fox News: ESPN.com’s Neyer was on board with Moneyball so early that he actually helped Lewis during the writing process. Gammons, ESPN’s venerable institution and the most influential baseball writer in America, helped the “Moneyball Philosophy” gain traction in the mainstream by embracing the concepts and incorporating them into his columns. Plaschke, the esteemed and influential writer for the L.A. Times, assaulted the credibility of Moneyballers by calling them computer geek traitors, with no real love or feel for the game. He would continue these assaults on the philosophy even as the A’s stayed successful, though no WMDs were found and Uday and Qusay were gone.
Jim Palmer as the American Public: Moneyball seemed bad and war acceptable at first, but now Moneyball seems acceptable and the war in Iraq less so. The A’s keep restocking and contending for their division title and in 2004 the Red Sox used their Weapon of Mass Destruction at roughly one-third of his actual market value. Palmer, and many other commentators, followed the tide and no longer understand the purpose of the war and accept the value of Moneyball even without fully understanding what the issue was to begin with. These commentators think the book was about On-Base Percentage, rather than undervalued assets, which at the time of Moneyball just happened to be On-Base Percentage. But at least they're trying to embrace new ideas.
That leaves us with Joe Morgan, a man without an exit strategy, defending his war to the end.
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